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Through a Glass Darkly 
The Content of Statistical Data on Foreign Direct Investment 
KATALIN ANTALÓCZY – MAGDOLNA SASS 
With the advancement of globalization, the role of foreign direct investment has grown 
rapidly both in the global economy and in individual national economies. As such, their 
analysis is unavoidable when examining practically any economic phenomenon. The main 
data source used for this purpose is that on foreign direct investment found in the balance of 
payments. However, the purpose of a balance of payments is to record how and in what form 
a country executes various financial transactions with the rest of the world. Thus, such data 
on direct investment does not necessarily correspond fully to the direct investment content of 
economic analysis. During the crisis, the increase in the use of transactions aimed at loss 
reduction and tax optimization by multinational companies has resulted in an even greater 
gap between the data and the phenomenon being analysed. Therefore the authors would like 
to emphasize that one needs to be very circumspect when analysing such data.

 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: F21, C80. 
Definition and economic content of foreign direct investment 
The economic significance of foreign direct investment (FDI)
1
 has grown in leaps and bounds 
over the last few decades. A multitude of books, articles and studies have analysed the 
evolution of its magnitude, regional and sector changes and the impact on the economies of 
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1
 In Hungary, the commonly used term is “working capital”. The reason for this is that around the time of the 
end of communism, there was an intention to clearly differentiate capital inflows of a debt nature, useable for 
any purpose, repayable with interest, and non-debt type capital inflows, the most important form of which is 
direct investment meaning production/service activity. The term alludes to the fact that this type of capital 
provides services and products. However, this expression is not used by Western academic literature; or rather it 
has a clear ideological association: it is considered Marxist terminology.  
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home and host countries. Since FDI is largely realized by multinational companies,
2
 FDI is 
used to measure or at least approximate these companies' role in the economic performance of 
each national economy. Detailed information on FDI is analysed by experts, researchers and 
policy makers interested in the evolution of the sectoral distribution of foreign-owned 
companies. Furthermore, the breakdown of FDI by investing countries yields information on 
the strength, variability and risk of bilateral capital ties. Incoming FDI is also important in the 
measure it contributes to investments realised in the host economy, and thus to economic 
growth. In addition, FDI can potentially have a positive impact on the receiving economy, 
improve the productivity of enterprises there, and the probability of this positive effect can 
increase with greater influx. FDI can also bring technical, technological, commercial, 
organizational, management know-how and innovative ideas to the host economy. The 
probability of this can be correlated with the amount of foreign capital that is arriving or 
already present in the economy. All this makes it clear that FDI statistics are among the most 
often used and most important macroeconomic data. 
Dunning [1994, p. 5], in his reference work on the subject, defines FDI as follows: foreign 
direct investment is an investment realised by an investing company outside of the economy, 
in which it is headquartered but within the company itself. FDI is effectively a package 
comprising capital, technology, management and manufacturing know-how as well as access 
to markets. Traditionally, the expansion beyond national borders of a company's activity is 
realised via foreign direct investment. FDI differs from portfolio investment in that it 
comprises not only financial capital but also the entirety of the package described above, and 
in that the investment results in no ownership changes, i.e. decision making control remains 
with the investor supplying the capital. This definition has the practical consequence that 
governments and analysts in general consider those foreign investments to be direct where the 
investing company acquires decisive control or influence in or over a foreign company. 
According to the IMF's definition (IMF, 2009, p. 99.), direct investment means control or 
significant influence and long-term ties. Besides financing, a direct investor provides know-
how, technology, management and marketing expertise. Companies with direct investment 
ties (i.e. parent and subsidiary companies) often trade with each other and finance each other's 
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 The group of multinational companies is itself heterogeneous, incorporating differing sizes, activities, 
strategies and nationalities. (Dunning–Lundan, 2008). The interpretation of the term “multinational company” is 
also quite diverse in Hungarian academic literature and journals (Czakó, 2011). These questions are not 
addressed in this article. 
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operations. For each country, the flow of capital is bidirectional, therefore we distinguish 
between inward (IFDI) and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). 
According the OECD's definition (OECD, no year, p. 7.), foreign direct investment is a type 
of investment where a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) obtains a lasting 
interest in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor. The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise 
and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. 
The existence of decisive control or influence is evidently a key component of every 
definition, and thus of our topic. Dunning [1990, p. 5.] opined that there was no complete 
international consensus on the share of holding that entails decisive control, but countries 
usually put this between 10 and 25 percent when accounting for foreign direct investment. 
There are many examples of subsidiaries under 100 per cent ownership whose day-to-day 
decisions cannot be wholly influenced by the parent, whereas minority or even particularly 
low shares of holding can enable significant influence. If the criterion is influence or votes, 
then we must also consider minority shareholding.  
For statistical recording, a consensus was eventually reached between the IMF and OECD, 
and it has become generally accepted that statistically, a holding of 10 percent or greater is 
considered a direct investment. Beyond this, the IMF distinguishes holdings over 50 percent 
(control) and holdings between 10 and 50 percent (significant influence). These are thresholds 
determined by consensus with the aim of standardizing data collection and classification. 
In summary, foreign direct investment is – according to the generally accepted definition – a 
type of investment where a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) obtains a lasting 
interest in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor. The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise 
and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. Its ownership share 
is 10 percent or greater. 
Data on foreign direct investment 
The primary data source for foreign direct investment is the “Direct Investments” line found 
in the financial account of the balance of payments. Its benefit is that it provides figures that 
are comparable internationally for both stock and flow, for inward as well as outward 
investments. Yet it is evident from the aforementioned 10 percent rule alone that this data 
item does not necessarily accurately measure the actual size of FDI. Indeed, this is not the aim 
of a balance of payments: rather, its main purpose is to account for financial and capital 
transactions between resident entities of the country in question – i.e. companies and 
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individuals registered there – and non-residents. Furthermore, data on direct investment may 
not necessarily be a good measure of the activities of multinational companies within the 
given country. Markusen [2002] and Lipsey [2007] among others have warned that balance of 
payments data do not reflect how much and what multinational companies produce or trade in 
the given economy. Nevertheless, according to calculations by Wacker [2013], FDI stock data 
generally give a good approximation of the relative size of the activities of multinational 
companies – although this also depends on the research question being researched. Thus, 
issues arise when examining investments: Ali-Yrkkö–Leino [2014] compared Finnish 
corporate data with FDI statistics from the balance of payments and demonstrated how annual 
inward FDI is a bad measure of investments realized in the Finnish economy by foreign-
owned companies. 
Also, the balance of payments accounts separately for investments made by non-resident 
entities within the country and those by resident entities made abroad. In both cases, 
investments are separated into three different components. The first category consists of 
equity stakes through shares or other ownership, which includes the establishment of new 
companies (greenfield investment), capital increases in existing companies, as well as 
acquisitions of firms. The second category includes reinvested earnings, where profits 
generated and reinvested by a company are recorded. (This is the difference between taxed 
earnings and dividends paid, calculated over a number of steps involving multiple line items 
of the balance of payments.) Finally, the “other capital” line is used to account for loans and 
repayments taken and granted within the group of companies related by common ownership. 
All data items within a balance of payments are balances: the balance of revenues and 
expenditure corresponding to assets and liabilities. (For example, capital invested by non-
resident entities in the host country via shares and other equity is the balance of capital paid in 
and capital withdrawn by the entities; i.e. the balance of company establishments and 
disinvestments or capital reductions. This is why the value of inward FDI, i.e. investments by 
non-resident entities in the host country can be negative if disinvestments and the reduction of 
capital exceeds the value of new firm establishments.) 
Recording rules and problems 
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The balance of payments is usually compiled by central banks,
3 
who supply data to the 
International Monetary Fund, which established and maintains the methodology for the 
balance of payments. In order to be able to perform its functions the IMF required to establish 
a standardized methodology for balance of payment statistics (standardized concepts, 
definitions, classifications, accounting principles) (MNB, 2012), as well as to continually 
adapt it to economic and financial developments. The IMF has required its members to report 
data regularly since 1948, and beyond these reporting requirements, in 1961 introduced the 
general principles of balance of payments. In 1977, it had to react to fundamental changes to 
the international financial system (the collapse of Bretton Woods and its consequences). This 
is when the fundamental concepts (such as the categories of ‘resident’ and ‘non-resident’) 
were re-clarified, along with accounting principles. In 2003, four working groups were 
established, which – again responding to significant economic changes – dealt with direct 
investments, economic and currency unions and general technical issues of the balance of 
payments, as well as accounting issues concerning reserves. The final version of the new 
Balance of Payments Manual (BPM6) was published on the IMF website in early 2010 (IMF, 
2010). (Reporting on this basis begins in 2014 in the European Union and thus also in 
Hungary.) 
Today, there are established international recording standards for foreign direct investment, 
yet there are substantial issues concerning the interpretation of the data. This is because issues 
can arise not only from differences in recording but also from the increasing complexity of the 
observed phenomena and that of global economic processes and capital flows in general.  
At lower levels of globalisation, when capital flows were restricted in many countries, 
accounting was relatively simple: an investor had to apply to a competent authority of the host 
country for a permit in which several particulars of the intended investment had to be 
submitted. Thus the authority issuing the permit could request the value and size of the 
intended investment, the intended activity, the headquarters of the investing company and the 
intended ownership share. In spite of this, FDI data was burdened with several problems that, 
by the 1980s, had been pointed out by numerous experts, among them Dunning [1994] who 
lists many of these. The problems are best demonstrated by inherent differences in the data of 
host and home countries. For example, according to data from Eurostat, German sources 
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 In a few cases, the compilation of the balance of payments is assigned to the office of statistics or the ministry 
of the economy. Even if formally one institution is responsible for this, it is typical for diverse organizations to 
collaborate in the collation and verification of data. For more detail see: IMF [2004b]. 
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registered 512 billion ECU of direct investment in Italy from Germany in 1988, while Italian 
sources put this figure at 335 billion ECU. In the case of the Netherlands and France, one 
country's reports show the Netherlands investing 195 million ECU in 1998, while the other 
put this at 857 million ECU (Dunning, 1994, p. 10.). What could be the causes of these 
significant differences? According to investigations (see: Dunning 1994, p. 10.) one of the 
greatest issues arose from differences in accounting methodology. In some countries, 
reporting was mandatory, while in others, it was done voluntarily. In some states, certain data 
was secret and therefore omitted from official FDI figures. Differences in investment values 
could also arise from foreign exchange differences, discrepancies between the book value and 
market value of companies, cross-border transfer pricing and many other factors.
4
 
Even back then, at lower levels of globalisation it was problematic to determine the 
nationality of investing multinational companies, i.e. the source country of inward investment. 
Although the public identifies Nokia as Finnish, Volvo as Swedish and Siemens as German, 
the shares of these and other major multinational companies are traded on the world's largest 
stock exchanges, and are partially or wholly (usually diversely) foreign owned, their boards 
are multinational and an ever greater portion of their activities are conducted outside the 
country of their headquarters. Often, joint ventures are formed, or the investment is done 
through a subsidiary operating outside the country of headquarters, as in the case of Siemens, 
whose investment in Hungary was realised through its Austrian subsidiary. Furthermore, these 
companies may be bought out by investors from other developed countries (e.g. Microsoft in 
the case of Nokia), or developing countries (e.g. Geely Automobile of China in the case of 
Volvo), thereby fundamentally altering the ownership structure and nationality of the owner.  
Starting with the last decade of the twentieth century, globalization has been accelerating 
rapidly. The end of bipolar world order, the IT revolution, the spread of the internet, the 
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 This problem also exists in the present day. UNCTAD in its 2011 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2011, 
p. 6.) published a detailed diagram about the difference between globally reported inward and outward FDI 
flows. The discrepancy occurred practically every year. The largest was in 2007, when the figure reported for 
outward flows exceeded the number registered for inward flows by 204 billion dollars. There is no consistent 
trend in whether inward FDI (IFDI) or outward FDI (OFDI) would be greater, although in the early 2000s, IFDI 
was greater, whereas in the post-crisis period, OFDI was larger. UNCTAD still considers the primary reason for 
the discrepancies to be accounting differences between countries, exchange rate differences in the currencies 
used for accounting and the increasing complexity of the nature of FDI. It must be mentioned that due to 
technical reasons the stock of inward FDI (IFDI) in a particular country can be better measured than outward 
FDI (OFDI). There are naturally more up-to-date and accessible data available on companies (and their equity) 
that operate within a given country than on their subsidiaries operating in another country.  
 7 
modernization of freight transport and the continuing liberalization of trade and capital flows 
has resulted in the expansion of the breadth and depth of globalization. There has been strong 
acceleration of capital flows in general and direct capital flows in particular. According to 
data from UNCTAD – which of course faces the same problems as discussed in detail above 
and therefore serve only as trend indicators – in 1990, the global FDI stock amounted to 2,078 
billion USD. This figure increased to 7,511 billion by 2000 and 25,464 billion USD by 2013, 
i.e. it grew by a factor of twelve over a quarter of a century (UNCTAD, 2014). 
The advancement of globalization has a number of aspects that cause FDI data to be less and 
less able to meet the requirements for the economic analysis of direct investments. One of the 
most striking effects of deepening globalization is the significant geographic and spatial 
expansion of Global Value Chains (GVCs). GVCs can encompass all activities of a company, 
from design through manufacturing all the way to marketing, in the home country and abroad. 
The fragmentation of manufacturing and its distribution between countries is not a new 
phenomenon, but one that has accelerated in recent years and the process has been extended 
to ever more products and even services. Cheaper and more reliable telecommunications, the 
development of the Internet, PCs, software, and freight transport has increasingly enabled the 
efficient running of subsidiaries over great distances and has made ever more products 
tradable. The liberalization of trade and removal of barriers has further reduced the cost of 
trading, aided by regulatory reforms in the infrastructure and transport sectors (OECD, 2013, 
p. 9.). Production chains have been augmented by suppliers, strategic alliances and 
subcontractors along with networks of companies that have formed extremely complex 
trading and financial ties.  
Liberalization of capital flows has enabled rapid, extensive, cross-border capital transfers 
within networks of companies. Thus, another significant change at the global level has been 
the increasing activity of multinational companies in the areas of organizational and tax 
optimization. Multinational companies – within their own network – have formed specialized 
corporate entities, their own “financial headquarters” or holding companies, through which 
they can redistribute income earned in the network. These companies are increasingly able to 
regroup their assets, sales and profits to the subsidiary operating in the location with the most 
favourable tax environment (Lipsey, 2007). Multinational companies can also exploit the 
benefits of differences between the financial regulations and tax levels of each country. Many 
of them therefore typically are headquartered in offshore locations or tax havens. Even as 
early as the 1980s, several multinational companies employed techniques that significantly 
reduced their tax burden. The mechanism named “Dutch sandwich” essentially meant that as 
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part of a foreign investment, a Dutch subsidiary was inserted between the home and final host 
countries. Thanks to the Netherlands having and extensive system of tax treaties and due to 
Dutch tax rules, the investing company was able to significantly reduce the taxes it had to pay 
on dividends in the receiving country (Kahale, 2011). The “double Irish” strategy allows 
multinational companies to significantly reduce their corporate tax bills. Here, profits were 
transferred from a country of higher tax levels to one with lower levels, in this case, Ireland 
(Darby–Lemaster, 2007). Under Irish tax rules, subsidiaries operating outside Ireland do not 
pay tax on their profits in Ireland. The Irish corporate tax is among the lowest in the 
developed world and Ireland also boasts an extensive system of tax treaties. US-based 
software companies were quick to discover this opportunity (e.g. Apple, Adobe, Facebook, 
Microsoft, Oracle and Yahoo). But there are also manufacturers based in the US that use this 
technique to significantly reduce their taxes, such as the pharmaceuticals Eli Lilly and Pfizer 
as well as General Electric and IBM. Gradually, other countries have “caught up” to the 
Dutch and the Irish. Analysts at the International Monetary Fund noted at the start of the new 
millennium that inward FDI into certain countries had grown substantially. These countries 
were typically offshore regions or tax havens, but in other cases they employed tax and 
financial regulations that benefitted foreign investors. For example, according to IMF 
estimates, 40 percent of foreign direct investment into Hong Kong between 1998 and 2002 
was connected to “round tripping”, where an investing company (usually from mainland 
China) realised an investment in its own country via a Hong Kong-based subsidiary (IMF, 
2004a, p. 2.). Another similar phenomenon is the so-called transhipment, where a foreign 
subsidiary is used to carry out foreign investment (Kalotay, 2012). (For example, Russian 
companies investing in Russia via Cyprus are round tripping, whereas their investing outside 
Russia is transhipment.) Therefore the International Monetary Fund in its Balance of 
Payments Manual (BPM5) has recommended to its member states that they filter out and 
report separately the capital flowing through these special purpose companies. One 
consequence of round tripping and transhipment is that direct and ultimate investing countries 
are different, leading to some countries being involved in direct capital flows in magnitudes 
way beyond their real economic significance (e.g. the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus, 
Hong Kong, and in our region Austria and Hungary).  
All of the above has resulted in the formation of extremely complex capital flow ties between 
resident and non-resident companies. There is also evidence of transfers between methods of 
payment. The place of capital paid in the form of permanently held equity or other stakes (e.g. 
capital increases) is often taken by other forms of capital payment that are more flexible and 
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repayable in future (debt). The increase in profits of subsidiaries in developing countries has 
increased reinvested profits in these countries, whereas financial uncertainty in Europe has 
suppressed equity investment (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 2.). 
The crisis of 2008 erupted and took its course in this global economic environment. The crisis 
heavily impacted the majority of multinational companies, especially in vehicle 
manufacturing and its supply chain as well as the financial sector. The crisis immediately 
snowballed through the network of global value chains. Nevertheless, GVCs and the 
environment of increasingly liberalized capital flows provided multinational companies with 
many opportunities to reduce losses stemming from the crisis (Stehrer et al., 2012, Sass–
Szalavetz, 2014), which were exploited to a greater degree than in the years before the crisis. 
These loss reduction techniques further complicated direct capital flows, and inflated the 
capital flow – considered direct investment according the statistical accounting methodology - 
with flows, which in many cases are estranged from the economic purpose of foreign direct 
investment. Determining direct and ultimate investors – i.e. the actual country of origin of the 
capital – has become increasingly difficult, and thus so has the analysis of the regional 
breakdown of direct capital flows.  
Therefore, the economic analysis of international data on foreign direct investment requires 
ever greater care. To demonstrate the potential pitfalls, we will use Hungary as a detailed 
example. 
The vulnerability of FDI data with Hungary as example  
Hungary was practically the first country in Central-Eastern Europe to open up its economy to 
foreign investors, and long retained a lead in attracting capital. Not unrelated to this, Hungary 
also acquired a leading role in the area of outward direct investment, with both Hungarian 
subsidiaries of multinational companies as well Hungarian-owned investors having made an 
early move towards foreign markets compared to others in the region. Hungarian FDI stock 
invested abroad is still among the highest in the region.
5  
Incorporation into global value chains 
To begin our analysis of Hungary, let's look at a chart showing direct investments realised by 
non-residents in Hungary as well as outward direct investments executed by Hungarian 
residents abroad. (See figure 1.) According to HNB data, the FDI stock invested in Hungary 
amounted to 80.1 billion euros at the end of 2013, while the FDI stock invested abroad by 
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 See e.g. Antalóczy [2004]; Antalóczy et al. [2014]; Katona [2013]; on the exceptional 
importance of external sources in regional comparison e.g. Bélyácz–Kuti [2012]. 
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domestic residents totalled 28.8 billion Euros excluding special purpose entities. Compared to 
1995, the first figure has grown by a factor of nine, and the second by a factor of 132.  
Figure 1 
Stock of direct investments by non-residents in Hungary (IFDI) and by Hungarian 
residents abroad (OFDI) at the end of 2013 according to BPM5 methodology 
(Euro millions)* 
 
* Data excluding SPEs, preliminary data for 2013. 




Starting around the end of the 1980s – through foreign direct investment – the Hungarian 
economy gradually became integrated into the international division of labour and became 
part of international production networks. The methods employed to encourage investment 
(e.g. industrial free trade zone regulations
6
 and tax breaks or reductions for major investors) 
attracted export-oriented investments and the largest multinational companies to Hungary. As 
early as at the end of the 1990s, 76 of the world's 100 largest non-financial multinational 
companies were present in Hungary in some form (Antalóczy–Sass, 2002, pp. 55–57). 
Hungary is deeply embedded into global value chains. (See Rechnitzer–Smahó, 2012 for an 
example on the automotive industry and Sass–Szalavetz, 2013 on the automotive and 
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 For greater detail, see: Antalóczy [1999]. 
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electronics industries) According to an OECD analysis (OECD, 2013) in 2009, Hungary took 
8th place among its member states on the participation index
7
 based on the degree of 
integration into GVCs. (Countries ranked ahead of Hungary were Luxembourg, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, South Korea, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands. Luxembourg stands out 
with its index exceeding 70 percent, while the countries ranked behind it have a participation 
index just over or just below 60 percent, with small variance between countries.) 
The level of integration into international capital flows and world trade is shown in Table 1. 
The leading Hungarian exporters (with the exception of Mol) are subsidiaries of well-known 
automotive, electronics and pharmaceutical multinational companies, which predominantly 
produce for export. 
Table 1  
Top 10 export companies in Hungary in 2012 




Mol Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. Yes 73.2 
Audi Hungária Motor Kft. Yes 99.4 
GE Infrastructure CEE Holding Kft. Yes 98.5 
Samsung Electronics Magyar Zrt. Yes 87.1 
Flextronics International Kft. Yes 91.0 
Nokia Komárom Kft. Yes 95.5 
PCE Paragon Solutions Kft. Yes 98.5 
Jabil Circuit Magyarország Kft. Yes 99.7 
Sanofi–Aventis/Chinoin Yes 88.4 
Robert Bosch Elektronika Kft. Yes 99.9 
Source: Own work and calculation based on HVG. 
The tax breaks and tax exemptions offered to major investors (eligibility for which only 
ceased with EU accession, and with previously granted breaks being valid until their expiry), 
as well as Hungary's rate of corporation tax for offshore companies being highly favourable 
all the way till 2006, incentivized companies to transfer their profits to Hungary, establish 
entities in the country and report revenue there. All of this – along with complex production 
chains and company networks – naturally showed up in the money and capital movements of 
the balance of payments, often among line items connected to foreign direct investment. Due 
to the crisis, money and capital movements became even more complex and subject to other 
motives. Below, we will use a handful of examples to demonstrate why great care must be 
taken when dealing with the FDI figures in Hungary's balance of payments, and why this data 
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 Participation index: Foreign input + domestically produced input within exports to third countries/gross exports 
(%). The indicator measures the export share of intermediate products (ones to be processed further). 
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must not be utilised for analysis unless augmented by corrections, deeper investigation and 
company-level analyses. 
Balance of payments, FDI, special purpose entities, capital in transit 
In Hungary, as is usual, it is the central bank's balance of payments statistics that account for 
direct capital flows. Within the balance of payments, the financial account section registers 
investments made by non-residents within Hungary and those by residents made abroad, 
accounted for according to the international standards and broken down by methods of 
payment as discussed above. 
Analysts at the Hungarian National Bank noted while preparing the balance of payments in 
the first third of the years 2000 – obviously not independently of work carried out by the IMF 
and the resulting recommendations –, that capital of significant magnitude was moving 
through Hungary. This capital matches the statistical definition of FDI, but not its economic 
content. Analysts removed data that did not match this content. Until 2005, these were 
essentially offshore companies (a legal category), but from 2006, a new category was created 
based on economic considerations and recommendations by the IMF and OECD. This new 
category was named “special purpose entities”, abbreviated SPE. SPEs are 100 percent 
foreign owned, the significance of real assets in their balance sheets is negligible in relation to 
that of financial instruments, and their net foreign financial position is close to zero. Their 
material costs are negligible, their headcounts are very low (90 to 95 percent employ a 
maximum of two persons). Their ties with the economy of the host country are insignificant 




Starting in 2006, The Hungarian National Bank published balance of payments statistics both 
including and excluding special purpose entities. Special purpose entities are primarily 
involved in the transfer of funds within a company group. Due to moneys flowing through 
them (the direction and magnitude, of which is controlled by their parent companies), SPEs 
merely play an intermediary role within the company group and are themselves not actually 
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 SPEs do not yet have an exact definition or delineation, but they do have a number of common features 
(OECD, 2008), of which we have listed several in connection with Hungarian SPEs. In Hungary, their number is 
estimated at a few hundred, they are primarily owned by US-based investors/multinational companies. Their 
existence is justified not only by the relatively favourable Hungarian tax rates, but also the treaty enacted in 1979 
between Hungary and the USA eliminating dual taxation (Koroknai, Lénárt-Odorán, 2011). In our interpretation, 
alongside the US subsidiaries, the 7th largest Hungarian company, the Brazilian Fibria shown in Table 9 can also 
be classified as an SPE.  
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targets of direct investment. Nevertheless, relatively large sums are moved through SPEs. A 
large proportion of SPEs were established in Hungary as a result of the previously favourable 
offshore regulations (an effective profit tax rate of below 10 percent). These regulations have 
been revoked in part due to OECD pressure, but a few companies have remained because 
some other regulatory aspect in Hungary (e.g. favourable taxation of foreign royalties) or 
somewhere abroad,
9
 that makes it worth their while to stay. Many countries may have such 
entities, but few countries account for them statistically. The fact that this is not a new 
phenomenon is indicated by UNCTAD data showing that in 2003, of total FDI stock, the 
following percentages flowed to such special purpose entities in these respective countries: 
France: 38 per cent, Germany: 23 per cent, Portugal: 20 per cent, USA: 6 per cent. No 2003 
data is available for Hungary, but figures are attainable starting in 2006.  
Table 2 
Stock of direct investments by non-residents in Hungary (IFDI) and of Hungarian 
residents abroad (OFDI) 
(Euro millions, %) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
IFDI stock 
excluding SPEs 
60,876 65,044 62,455 68,608 67,947 66,086 78,488 80,639 
IFDI stock 
including SPEs 
91,003 133,420 181,940 184,260 159,129 174,906 187,725 185,230 
Share of SPEs 
within all IFDIs 
(%) 
33 51 66 63 57 62 58 56 
OFDI stock 
excluding SPEs 
9,394 11,801 12,485 13,704 15,295 18,834 26,592 28,774 
OFDI stock 
including SPEs 
43,378 90,710 134,149 129,994 108,781 126,299 142,027 140,825 
Share of SPEs 
within all OFDIs 
(%) 
462 769 1,075 949 711 671 534 489 
Source: Own work and calculation based on HNB data. 
Table 2 vividly illustrates that even as early as at the start of statistical data collection, the 
share of special purpose entities of the total FDI stock was extremely high in an international 
context.
10
 The figures are especially poignant on the OFDI side, since Hungary - having been 
an economy in transition, which was only integrated into international capital flows later - has 
relatively low OFDI stock when excluding SPEs. In this sense, the ratio of SPEs rose up to 
the year when the crisis erupted, then decreased continuously, but even in 2013 it was close to 
five times the size of OFDI stock excluding SPEs. A similar trend can be observed on the 
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 Alternatively, particular changes in foreign regulations caused Hungarian regulations to become relatively 
favourable, making it worthwhile to direct money flows through Hungarian subsidiaries. 
10
 The distorting effect of SPEs on debt indicators is analysed by Koroknai–Lénárt-Odorán [2011]. 
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IFDI side: here, the ratio doubled in the year at the start of the crisis, only slightly decreased 
subsequently and has exceeded 50 per cent each year. In an international comparison the 
Hungarian ratios are considered exceptional: only Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Hong 
Kong have higher indicators for IFDI, whereas we have not found figures even approaching 
Hungary's for OFDI (See Table 3.). We find it probable that other economies in transition 
exhibit similar phenomena, however, no data was found to support this. (See also: Hunya, 
2014) This suggests that Hungary continues to serve as a kind of tax haven for SPEs. 
 Table 3 
Share of SPEs of the total FDI stock invested in 2009  
(Percentage) 
Country Share of direct capital stock 
IFDI stock OFDI stock 
Cyprus 33 31 
Denmark 22 18 
France 9 6 
Luxembourg 93 90 
Netherlands 79 75 
Argentina 2 – 
Hong Kong, China 66 73 
Singapore 34 – 
Source: UNCTAD [2012, p. 7.]. 
In 2012, analysts at the Hungarian National Bank once again noted very high volumes of 
capital inflows and outflows - outside of special purpose entities – that by statistical definition 
count towards FDI and were to be shown in this category of the balance of payments. The 
phenomenon had started in earlier years, therefore following a survey of the processes, data 
was retrospectively corrected back to 2008. The phenomenon, designated “capital in transit” 
is a transaction that occurs within a company group (linked through ownership), transiting 
through a given economy without affecting it. (It is not a “package”; it does not create new 
production, service capacity or jobs.) We find it likely that Hungary is not the only country 
where FDI figures are distorted by this factor: e.g. in Luxembourg in 2004, 80 percent of 
inward FDI was associated with capital in transit and/or SPEs (UNCTAD, 2004). The purpose 
of using capital in transit is probably the maximization of company profit, minimization of 
losses and tax optimization. 
The phenomenon has been around in Hungary in significant magnitude since the crisis. Its 
evolution and size – together with total FDI flows and all corrections – are summarized in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 
Stock of direct investments by non-residents in Hungary (IFDI) 
(Annual inflow, euro millions) 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total direct investment 49,786 3,538 –27,874 16,239 11,205 1,768 
Direct investment excluding 
SPEs 
4,191 1,476 1,675 4,131 10,851 2,317 
Capital in transit and asset 
portfolio restructuring 
1,081 188 409 2,613 6,935* 534 
Direct investment excluding 
transfer of capital in transit 
and asset portfolio 
restructuring 
3,110 1,288 1,266 1,518 3,916 1,783 
* Of the 6,935 million euro correction, capital in transit amounts to 3,935 million Euros and 
asset portfolio restructuring amounts to 3,000 million euro. (In other years, the value of asset 
portfolio restructuring is 0. For more detail on asset portfolio restructuring, see Footnote 13.)  
Source: Authors’ compilation based on HNB data. 
The share of capital in transit within FDI inflows excluding SPEs was extremely large (63-64 
percent) in 2011 and 2012, and was around 25 percent in the other years studied, which 
certainly amounts to a notable share. During the economic analysis of FDI, only data 
excluding the above two items is usable.  
It must be added to the economic content of the 2012 numbers that over this year, a 
significant portion (an estimated 1.4 billion Euros) of foreign direct investment was realised 
in banks. Parent banks used this method for loss reductions at their Hungarian subsidiaries, 
thus these investments did not create new capacity or jobs. (Therefore this sum must be 
subtracted from the 3.9 billion euro if we wish to attain a realistic insight into real inward 
FDI.) 
We must hereby also draw attention to errors in the international data. UNCTAD – whose 
FDI numbers are used all over the world to analyse direct investment flows – published in 
2014's World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 205.) numbers that included capital in 
transit and asset portfolio restructuring. That is how it is possible that according to their report 
for example, 2013 saw almost 14 billion dollars of direct investment arrive in Hungary, a 
figure which for this year, and without any real economic basis, stands far above other new 
EU member states.  
Capital in transit, as its name suggests, not only shows up on the inward side, but also on the 
outward side (OFDI), strongly distorting data on residents' investments abroad. (See Table 5.) 
Table 5 
Direct investments by residents abroad (OFDI) 
(Annual inflow, euro millions) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total direct investment 48,472 3,048 –30,812 14,847 9,053 1,781 
Direct investment excluding 
SPEs 
1,514 1,348 887 3,141 5,800 1,701 
Capital in transit and asset 1,081 188 513 2,687 4,309 533 
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portfolio restructuring 
Direct investment excluding 
capital in transit and asset 
portfolio restructuring 
433 1,160 374 454 1,491 1,168 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on HNB data. 
Furthermore, a crucial problem for analysts is that stock data in the HNB's database is – at 
present – not cleaned of capital in transit and asset portfolio restructuring. Thus both 
breakdowns by country and by sector contain economically irrelevant data – therefore these 
numbers are not suitable for analysis and use in models. An important question is whether 
these data problems occur for any other countries. Based on the favourable regulations, it 
would be reasonable to assume that through SPEs, Hungary would be a significant location 
for tax optimization transactions by multinational companies, thus Hungary's FDI data may be 
more strongly affected in a regional comparison. However, some old EU member states – as 
we saw - are probably more significantly affected. Still, we must agree with the analysis of 
Hunya [2014], according to which we can surmise that the other countries of Central-Eastern 
and Southern Europe also have similar data problems, but since their central banks do not 
prepare and publish detailed statistics broken down into capital in transit, SPEs and asset 
portfolio restructuring, these issues are less conspicuous.  
In the next two sections, we will highlight further problems with sector-industry and national 
breakdowns and use examples to illustrate why great care must be used when dealing with the 
FDI figures in the balance of payments. 
Sector and industry data problems: Foreign companies' automotive investments in Hungary 
Hungary is one of the prime targets of automotive investments in the CEE region. While there 
is more capacity for manufacturing cars in the other three Visegrád countries, Hungary has 
also been successful in attracting investment into the industry: Suzuki has been producing cars 
in the country since 1991, Audi since 1998 and Mercedes since 2012.
11
 Furthermore, the 
presence of foreign automotive suppliers is also significant, e.g. Knorr-Bremse, the 
Continental group and Robert Bosch. Yet if we seek to find traces of this significant 
automotive capacity in Hungary's statistics on FDI beyond 2009, we will be disappointed. 
(See Table 6.) 
Table 6 
FDI stock invested in the manufacturing of vehicles and its share in total FDI 
stock invested in Hungary and of FDI stock invested in the manufacturing 
industry  
                                                          
11
Opel used to assemble cars in Hungary starting in 1991, but gradually transferred this activity to Poland, and 
today only manufactures engines in Szentgotthárd.  
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(Percentage) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FDI into vehicle 
manufacturing (euro millions) 
4,627.7  3,957.1  3,394.1  –1,693.2  2,517.8  
Share of total FDI stock (%) 7.41 5.77 5.00 –2.59 3.24 
Share of manufacturing 
industry FDI stock (%) 
26.70 22.94 19.55 –17.13 15.91 
NB: TEÁOR 08 29–30. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HNB data. 
It can be seen that the size of the capital invested in the sector (which boasts significant 
capacities that increased further in the period analysed due to Mercedes' greenfield 
investments and supplementary investments by Audi and Opel) decreased between 2008 and 
2010, until in 2011, this figure turned negative. (A negative figure in this case has the 
economic meaning that non-residents divested more from than invested in the industry.) Then 
for 2012 we find a modest but positive figure for Vehicle Manufacturing. The industry’s share 
of total FDI stock and of manufacturing FDI stock developed accordingly.  
Upon closer inspection, we find that one of the significant events underlying the changes to 
automotive FDI stock were changes in the situation and organization of Audi, the most 
important automotive investor in Hungary. According to the company's 2012 balance sheet 
report, in November 2011, the sole owner, Audi AG of Germany apported the shares of its 
Hungarian subsidiary, Audi Hungária Motor Kft. into Audi Hungária Services Zrt. This latter 
company, Audi Hungária Services Zrt., commenced operations in Győr in October 2011. Its 
sole owner is Germany's Audi AG, therefore it is 100 percent German owned. Yet it is a 
company registered in Hungary and thus a resident from the balance of payments perspective, 
i.e. its 100 percent owned subsidiary Audi Hungária Motor Kft. no longer counts as foreign 
owned, but rather domestic (owned by a resident). Hence it does not feature in Hungary's 
automotive FDI stock. [The principal activity of Audi Hungária Services Zrt. is not car 
manufacturing but business consulting (shared services and legal advice), and its nominal 
capital is a mere 200,000 euro. Thus it is recorded as a services FDI company with a relatively 
low capital base.]
12 
We also know from the previous section that stock FDI data includes 
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 The situation is complicated by the fact that Audi Hungária Services Zrt., according to its balance sheet, 
posted 3 billion euro of depreciation in 2012 for Audi Hungária Motor Kft., and simultaneously acquired an 
equal stake in a Belgian subsidiary of Volkswagen Group Services SA, the latter of course is registered on the 
outward FDI (OFDI) side. This transaction is marked as asset portfolio restructuring by balance of payments 
statistics. 
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capital in transit and asset portfolio transfers, which affect the 2011–2012 figures in 
particular. Therefore the negative stock figure and its subsequent turning positive in 2012 are 
impossible to interpret based on this data. We can merely guess when attempting to find 
economic meaning in the numbers. It is possible that in 2012 part of Mercedes' investment 
was accounted for, as well as its capital increase and Opel's supplementary investment, and 
automotive suppliers may also have realised supplementary investments. The crisis has had a 
powerful effect on domestic automotive suppliers – both Hungarian and foreign owned. 
Companies that were successful in handling the crisis did so by providing additional services 
to customers, or shifted to other, more complex activities that, e.g. Chinese and Indian 
suppliers could not compete with (Antalóczy–Sass, 2010). This aspect of crisis management 
may also have had the effect of attracting foreign capital. Despite the above, we must once 
again emphasize that based on the data available, it is impossible to analyse foreign 
investment into Hungary's automotive industry. 
Data problems concerning the origin of the investor: US capital in Hungary 
It is evident to informed consumers, buyers or those keeping up with domestic economic 
developments that numerous US-based multinational companies are present in Hungary: most 
through their products, but a great number also through direct investment and production. 
However, according to HNB FDI data excluding SPEs, the stock of US investments in the 
2000s has been very modest and furthermore decreased significantly over the last 2-3 years. 
Thus the stock, which between 2008 and 2010 had averaged 2.9 billion euro, dwindled to 1.9 
billion euro by 2012. This amounts to just 2.5 percent of total foreign direct investment in 
Hungary. Even the higher figure of 2.9 billion euro (and the share of the total stock of 4.6 
percent) seems low given the number of large American investors and investments in 
Hungary, let alone the size and share figures for 2012. (See Table 7.) 
Table 7 
Stock of total FDI in Hungary and stock of FDI from the USA 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total FDI stock 
excluding SPEs (euro 
millions) 
62,455 68,608 67,947 65,398 77,756 
FDI stock from USA 
excluding SPEs (euro 
millions) 
2,867 2,890 2,965 2,168 1,914 
Share of USA excluding 
SPEs (%) 
4.6 4.2 4.4 3.3 2.5 
Total FDI stock 
including SPEs (euro 
181,940 184,260 159,129 173,941 186,665 
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millions) 
FDI stock from USA 
including SPEs (euro 
millions) 
956 –111.8 4,049 16,254 13,746 
Share of USA including 
SPEs (%) 
0.5 – 2.5 9.3 7.4 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HNB data. 
Examination of the presence of American FDI in Hungary provides an opportunity to review 
some concrete reasons and motives for why data on the investing country distribution of FDI 
yields little information on the composition by ultimate investing countries. 
Alongside the techniques already mentioned in this article (Dutch sandwich, Double Irish) 
and investments made via subsidiaries in third countries, during the crisis it has become ever 
more common for a multinational company to restructure its subsidiaries: even if the parent 
realised its investments directly, it subsequently delegated control over it to one of its regional 
subsidiaries, one that is closer to the investment target or one, that is otherwise considered 
high priority (e.g. due to a more favourable tax environment). Using various sources, we have 
compiled a list of the largest US-based multinational companies investing in Hungary and we 
looked at their characteristics from the point of view of the nationality of the investor-owner. 
Our results are shown in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Top 16 US investments in Hungary in 2012 
Rank Company Direct owner 
1. GE Austrian, Dutch 
2. Budapest Bank USA 
3. Flextronics Austrian 
4. Jabil Dutch 
5. Philip Morris Swiss 
6. Lear Luxembourg 
7. Alcoa-Köfém Spanish 
8. Cargill Dutch 
9. National Instruments Austrian 
10. Delphi Austrian 
11. GlencoreGrain Swiss 
12. Unilever British 
13. Coca-Cola Dutch 
14. GM Opel Spanish 
15. Corning Hungary Luxembourg 
16. Kimberly-Clark British 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on AMCHAM company listings, HVG TOP 500 and the 
balance sheet reports of companies concerned.  
Among our estimated top 16 US subsidiaries, the direct investor was US-based in only one 
single case; in all other cases, the Hungarian investment was carried out through Austrian, 
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Dutch, Swiss, Luxembourg-based, Spanish or British subsidiaries. [There may be many 
reasons for this: in most cases, it is the above-mentioned tax optimization,
13
 but another 
motive may be the US multinational company establishing a European centre, and directing 
all its European investments from there, or simply the fact that the intermediary subsidiary 
(e.g. Austrian) is more familiar with the Hungarian investment landscape.] The HNB in its 
balance of payments statistics reports the nationality of the investing company – according to 
IMF requirements
14 – based on the direct investor, not the ultimate one: therefore in our 
example, GE's investment is shown as coming from the Netherlands and Austria (from the GE 
subsidiaries based there). This explains why the share of US capital in Hungarian FDI stock is 
so tiny while the majority of large US multinational companies as well as many medium-sized 
ones are present with production or service facilities in Hungary. 
It is likely that today, it is not only US-based companies that utilise these techniques. Let us 
look at the situation with the largest Hungarian companies by sales. (See Table 9.) 
Table 9 
Top 20 non-financial companies by revenue in Hungary in 2012 
 Company name Ownership structure Sector Revenue (forint 
millions) 
1. Mol Magyar Olaj- és 
Gázipari Nyrt. 
Diverse, greatest share: 
MNV Zrt (Hungarian – 
24.74%), C.EZ (Czech– 
7.35%) 
Energy 5,522,316 
2. Audi Hungária Motor Kft. HUNGARIAN (100%),  
ultimate: German (100%) 
Automotive 1,612,480 
3. GE Infrastructure CEE 
Holding 
Direct investors: Austrian 
and Dutch 
 ultimate: USA 
Energy, machinery and 
business consulting 
1,447,328 
4. Magyar Villamos Művek 
Zrt. 
Hungarian (100%) Energy supply 767,754 
5. Samsung Electronics 
Magyar Zrt. 
South Korean (100%) Electronics 713,517 
6. E.On Földgáz Trade Zrt. German (100%) Energy trading 699,415 
7. FibriaTrading International Direct: Brazilian (48.3 
%), Hungarian (51.7 %); 
ultimate: Brazilian 
Paper wholesale 611,394 




(0.25%); ultimate: British 
Retail 607,931 
9. Magyar Telekom 
Távközlési Nyrt. 
Diverse (stock exchange), 
greatest share: T-Mobile 
Telecoms 607,128 
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See for example for US investments on the role of the Netherlands: Kahale [2011], on the role of Luxembourg, 
a report by the US embassy there: http://luxembourg.usembassy.gov/doing-business-local.html, and in general 
about direct and indirect FDI: Kalotay [2012]. 
14
 OECD [2008] recommends to publish various supplementary data for FDI, among others composition by 
ultimate investor countries. 
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Global Holding Nr. 2 
GmbH (59.21%), German 
10. E.On Hungária Energetikai 
Zrt. 
German (100%) Energy supply 570,852 








German (50%), Russian 
(40%), Hungarian (10%) 
Energy trading 424,219 
13. Magyar Suzuki Zrt. Japanese (100%) Automotive 409,150 
14. Nokia Komárom Kft. Finnish (100%) Electronics 394,376 
15. PCE ParagonSolutions Kft. Cayman Islands (100%) 
ultimate: Taiwanese 
Electronics 379,430 
16. Tiszai Vegyi Kombinát 
Nyrt. 
Hungarian (Mol majority 
holding: 94.86%) 
Chemicals 374,584 
17. Sanofi–Aventis/Chinoin Direct: Hungarian 
(100%), ultimate: French 
Pharmaceuticals 364,329 
18. Spar Magyarország 
Kereskedelmi Kft. 
Direct: Swiss (100%),  
ultimate: Dutch  
Retail 356,614 
19. Borsodchem Zrt. Hungarian (100%), 
intermediate: 
Luxembourg (96%), 
Cyprus (4%), ultimate: 
Chinese 
Chemicals 350,575 
20. JabilCircuit Magyarország 
Kft. 
Direct: Dutch (49%), 
Luxembourg (49%), 
Scottish (2%);  
ultimate: USA 
Electronics 342,333 
NB: Several companies had ownership changes during 2013–14; the table reflects the status in 2012. 
Source: HVG TOP 500 and authors’ compilation based on balance sheet reports (ownership structure). 
 
Analysis of the largest companies by sales confirms that it is equally important to carry out 
more detailed, company level examinations when dealing with data on the breakdown of FDI 
by ultimate home countries.  
Summary and conclusions 
The ramping-up of foreign direct investments and the ever more intensive activity of 
multinational companies not only attracts scientific attention but also strengthens the need for 
economic policy-making to have a clear picture of the role they play in the economy. Out of 
the available indicators, the data published in the balance of payments is clearly the best: it is 
available most widely and most easily and thanks to the efforts of international organizations, 
enables comparisons as well as striving to meet the challenges posed by the changing global 
economic environment. The analysts of the Hungarian National Bank carry out important and 
thorough work in this area, the result of which is reliable Hungarian FDI data. At the same 
time, multinational companies under the pressure of the crisis are relying ever more heavily 
on the organizational and tax optimization techniques that they have strived to employ; 
starting with the 1980s in order to improve operational efficiency and/or reduce their tax 
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burden. As a result of this, not only do today's full flow and stock FDI data contain an ever 
greater proportion of elements that cannot be considered FDI in an economic sense, but in 
addition, the FDI breakdown data by sector and activity yields decreasing amounts of useable 
information. For example, today we cannot know with certainty the ultimate country of origin 
of an investor, the real locations of production and it is difficult to assess a country's real 
ability to attract FDI. It is not possible to mechanically compare FDI invested in various 
countries without knowing the precise content and it could likewise lead to false conclusions 
if one solely considers the breakdown by country or sector in the balance of payments report 
when evaluating the regional and sector and industry composition of inward and outward FDI 
for a particular country.  
The subject area certainly demands continued analysis and study – this article is intended to 
raise initial awareness. 
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